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All members of a category are not equal - some are more prototypical than others.
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All members of a category are not equal - some are more prototypical than others.
If asked to name a bird, most people in Europe will name something like a robin or a blackbird – rather than a penguin or an ostrich. These are birds, but are less ‘birdy’ than the prototype.
In classical theories of categorisation, objects are placed in categories because they share certain features. But the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein noticed that some categories (his example was games) include objects with little in common with one another – for example, chess and baseball. He used the term ‘family resemblance’ to explain why they are in the same category.
Eleanor Rosch talks about ‘natural categories’, in which objects are defined by their distance from the prototype for that category. So furniture is more likely to call to mind a table or chair than a lamp. A bird is a robin but also an ostrich.
Prototype theory points both to opportunities and pitfalls for information designers. Using prototypical examples helps achieve cognitive economy (people recognise them faster), but in social categories they can perpetuate stereotypes (for example, that a truck driver is protypically male, or a nurse protypically female). There is also an implication here for icon design.
Rosch, Eleanor (1973). ‘Natural categories’. Cognitive Psychology. 4 (3): 328–350
Rosch, Eleanor (1988), ‘Principles of Categorization’, Readings in Cognitive Science, Elsevier, pp. 312–322.
Lakoff, G. (1987) Women, fire and dangerous things. University of Chicago Press.